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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

DDI 6195-82
28 July 1982MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

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SUBJECT: Talking Points: DCI Meeting with Judge Clark -- Middle
East Prospects

1. If the West Beirut question is resolved by Ambassador Habib's efforts, Lebanese attention will focus on the Presidential election. Israel and Syria will each seek to preserve its respective sphere of influence:

- Israel will stay in the south by keeping troops there, buttressing Haddad and backing Bashir's electoral strategy.
- Syria will push to increase its ties to Muslims and leftists while retaining troops in the Bekaa.

The US can probably tolerate this de facto partition for a time. Both Tel Aviv and Damascus will have satisfied their immediate security needs. Over the longer term, however, this partition would be unstable as each side and its Lebanese surrogates seek to expand their influence. US policy moves to resolve the Palestinian issue would have the best chance of keeping tensions contained.

2. The Israeli-Phalange relationship has become somewhat more tense. Since the invasion Bashir has sought to avoid overly close association with Sharon and Begin -- sparking some resentment in Tel Aviv. This is a potentially positive feature for the US because it offers some room to maneuver with Bashir and could enhance Phalange acceptability with the Saudis and Syrians.

3. The confluence of regional events -- the continuing impasse over Beirut and the Gulf war -- harbor great risks for US policy goals throughout the region by enhancing the position of anti-US radicals of both the Palestinian and Shia fundamentalist variety. The threat of an outright Iranian victory at Al Basrah -- the so-called "worst case" scenario --

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still carries great risks for the Gulf states and for their relations with us. It is the judgment of the Community that Iranian control of southern Iraq, from Al Basrah to the Kuwaiti border, will bring about the kind of accommodation to Iranian policies within Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar that will encourage Shia radicalism there and perhaps even in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman.

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Attachment:

Memo to DCI (DDI-6191-82)

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